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vigorously defend what he considers to be a hopeless cause solely for the reason
that in this way he will be assured that his being found guilty to a traffic in-
fraction will not be brought into evidence in a later civil suit.
The Court in the instant case has cast aside legal niceties in order to
render a decision that is significant in its practical approach to a problem that
has harrassed many civil magistrates, not to mention countless defense counsel.
In the harsh realities of today's courtroom procedure, technical concepts must
give way to practical solutions, and Ando v. Woodberry does just that.
JOSEPH M. AUGUSTINE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PROSECUTION FOR UNDERLYING FELONY FOLLOWING
ACQUITTAL FOR FELONY-M-IURDER.
The petitioner, in People ex rel. Santangelo v. Tutuska,' brought a writ of
habeas corpus while awaiting trial for burglary and attempted robbery. He
based his writ on the ground that the charges in the indictment would subject
him to double jeopardy, in that he had previously been tried and acquitted
of murder in the first degree on a felony-murder theory in which indictment
the underlying felonies were the burglary and robbery for which he was
presently indicted.
In New York the prohibition against twice placing an individual in peril
for a single offense is embodied in several provisions of the law.2 Since it has
been held that Section 1938 of the Penal Law embodies, 3 if not perhaps extends,
the constitutional immunity against double jeopardy,4 the Court considered
and rejected the petitioner's contention under that section. The Court dismissed
petitioner's writ holding that robbery or burglary, unlike assault which is
inherent in every murder, is a separate and distinct crime, a crime that may be
committed without committing the crime of murder.
Although courts agree that to try a defendant twice for the same offense
is deplorable, they have considerable difficulty, due to the large number of
statutory offenses, in determining whether or not given sets of facts supporting
two or more charges are, in law, the same offense.5
Section 1938 prohibits not only a second prosecution for the same offense,
1. 19 Misc. 2d 308, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
2. N.Y. Const., art. 1, § 6, "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense"; N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 9, "No person can be subject to a
second prosecution for a crime for which be has been prosecuted and duly convicted or
acquitted."; N.Y. Penal Law § 1938.
3. Section 1938 of the Penal Law provides that "An act or omission which is made
criminal and punishable in different ways, by different provisions of law, may be punished
under any one of those provisions, but not under more than one; and a conviction or
acquittal under one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other
provision."
4. People v. Snyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 148 N.E. 796 (1925); People v. Repola, 280 App.
Div. 735, 117 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 740, 113 N.E,2d 42 (1953).
5. See: Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense, and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513
(1949); Note 7 Brooklyn L.R. 79 (1938).
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but double punishment as well. Under the multiple punishment provision, if
the same act is alleged to have violated various provisions of the law, the
defendant can be sentenced for only the more serious of the convictions. How-
ever, if separate and distinct acts can be established as a basis for each of the
violations, consecutive sentences will stand. In any event, the test to determine
the identity of offenses is the same under the multiple punishment provision
and the multiple prosecution provision.6
In a situation where one is prosecuted a second time for a different sub-
stantive offense arising out of the same criminal acts, most courts, including
those in New York, utilize a "same evidence" rule to determine the identity
of offenses.7 As generally stated the test is not whether a single act violates
two statutes,8 but ". . whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not."9 This broad test is subject to the qualification, at least
in New York's multiple punishment cases, that ". . . if there were merely a
single inseparable act violative of more than one statute, or if there were an act
which itself violated one statute and was a material element of the violation
of another, there would have to be a single punishment ... [Court's
emphasis.] Nor is multiple punishment, or multiple prosecution permitted for
crimes which necessarily must be committed in the commission of another
crime, generally classified as "included" crimes.:"
The Court in the instant case concluded that because the indictment in
the first prosecution would not have supported a conviction for the underlying
felony subsequently put to proof in the trial, the defendant was not previously
acquitted, nor put in jeopardy, for the felonies charged in the second indict-
ment. The form of the indictment in the first prosecution charged the defendant
with having killed with malice aforethought, and the necessity of showing malice
could have been satisfied by showing that the homicide occurred while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of another felony. He could not
have been convicted of the underlying felony under an indictment so drawn.
Thus, because the indictments were not eo nomine, there was no merit to the
plea of double jeopardy. Nor, held the Court, did the underlying felony become
an element of the murder so as to become an included crime. Proof of these
crimes was only evidence of an inferred criminal intent and not the element
of criminal intention itself.
In concluding that the underlying felonies were separate and distinct
crimes, the Court relied on Pople v. Nichols,'2 where it had been contended
that the trial court had erred in refusing to charge the jury that the defendant
could have been convicted of the underlying felony under an indictment similar
6. People v. Savarese, 1 Misc. 2d 305, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (County Ct. 1952).
7. Ibid.
8. People v. Repola, supra note 4.
9. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
10. People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 264, 159 N.Y.S.2d 303, 205 (1957).
11. People v. Saverese, supra note 6.
12. 230 N.Y. 221, 129 N.E. 883 (1921).
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to that in the instant case. The Court rejected this position and held that the
crimes of murder and burglary are substantively separate offenses. In order to
constitute murder in the first degree the felony must be so separated from the
homicide as not to be an element of that homicide. Also, in People v. Lytton,13
it was held that only a single crime is charged under this type of indictment,
and the felony, akin to deliberation and premeditation, is utilized to character-
ize the degree of the crime charged.
In other jurisdictions that have considered the problem, the courts have
nearly unanimously held the underlying felony to be a separate and distinct
crime, 14 and that a prosecution for a felony-murder is not a prosecution for
the entire transaction as one offense, but only for one of the offenses committed
within the transaction.
In New Jersey, however, in State v. Greely,i5 on facts similar to the
instant case, the Court considered the immunity violated since the prosecution
separated into its component parts, for purposes of separate prosecution, an
episode that constitutes a single criminal act. The Court there felt that robbery
is no less inherent in felony-murder than assault is inherent in battery, and any
idea that there was no jeopardy on the score of robbery is unrealistic since it
was essential to the murder charged. The result is a second trial which attempts
to place the defendant, not in a new jeopardy, but the same jeopardy to a
reduced degree.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment has little restrictive effect on state policies
regarding double jeopardy. 16 In Hoag v. New Jersey,'1 the Court, in a five-to-
thre decision, held that the defendant was not placed twice in jeopardy contrary
to the 14th Amendment. There the defendant had, in a single act, robbed five
people. The State chose to indict him for robbery of only three of the victims,
and although all five were witnesses at the trial, only one victim identified the
defendant who had claimed he was elsewhere at the time. After being acquitted,
the defendant was found guilty in an identical second trial under an indictment
charging robbery of one of the victims not included in the first indictment.
This the Court said was not an attempt to wear the accused out by a multi-
tude of cases with accumulated trials. However, the case may have a dis-
tinguishing factor in that the Court mentioned that the actions of the prosecutor
were not arbitrary or lacking in justification since two of the witnesses, after
having previously identified the defendant, refused to do so at the trial. Thus it
13. 257 N.Y. 310, 178 N.E. 290 (1931).
14. Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924); People v. Andrae, 305 I1.
530, 137 N.E. 496 (1922); State v. Ragan, 123 Kan. 399, 256 P. 169 (1927); Common-
wealth v. Crecorian, 264 Mass. 94, 162 N.E. 7 (1928); State v. Orth, 106 Ohio App. 35,
153 N.E.2d 395 (1957), appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 388, 148 N.E.2d 917 (1958).
15. 30 N.J. Super. 180, 103 A.2d 639 (1954), aff'd, 31 N.J. Super. 542, 107 A.2d 439
(1954).
16. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
17. 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
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would appear that even though different offenses are involved, successive prose-
cutions to litigate them may, if without justification, violate the due process
concept under the 14th Amendment.
As mentioned previously, Section 1938 prohibits not only multiple prosecu-
tions, but also multiple punishment. Although the test for each is the same,
the policy underlying each differs. Under the latter, it would seem that the
dominant policy is to insure that the punishment is commensurate with the
crime. A narrow search into the nature of the offense may prevent double
punishment without being unduly lenient with a criminal who offends several
provisions of the law with a single act. However, the inquiry should broaden
when successive prosecutions are involved. Underlying the idea of double
jeopardy is the fact that the state, a powerful unit with vast resources, should
not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense. Not only is the accused to be protected from excessive harass-
ment, but the public also must be protected from the expense of unnecessary
litigation, i.e., a series of trials to adjudicate what is factually a single case.' 8
Justice Brennan, in Abbate v. United States,19 described the distinction
between multiple punishment and multiple prosecution as follows; ,... [though
there is] .. .no violence to the guarantee against double jeopardy when the
same acts are made to do service for several convictions at one trial, I think
not mere violence to, but virtual extinction of, the guarantee results if the
Federal Government may try people over and over again for the same criminal
conduct just because each trial is based on a different federal statute protecting
a separate federal interest."20 Professor Wechsler has supported this immunity
to successive prosecutions as intended "... to cast the balance in favor of
cleaning up the charges against a particular man at one time, in the view that
he is only one man, and that however many things he has done, the slate ought
so far as possible to be cleaned so that he may be dealt with as the one man
that he is, and appropriately disposed of.2 '
Although it appears that under the present holdings the felony in a felony
murder trial is doubly punishable, this determination should not end inquiry
into what is essentially a different problem. In the first instance, the Nichols
and Lytton cases involved a determination that the felonies were independent,
separate from the crime of homicide. Without this qualification every homicide
would be a felony-murder prosecution. However, this characterization should
not be extended to serve as a" substitute for analysis of the double jeopardy
concept and determining whether the independence of the felony so separates
the felony from the homicide as to become a separate act in the sense of the
double jepoardy prohibition. Secondly, assuming the separateness of the felony,
18. PeopIe v. Ercole, 4 N.Y.2d 617, 176 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1958); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957).
19. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
20. 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959).
21. AL.. Proceedings 139 (1956).
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numerous proceedings to litigate several substantive offenses arising from one
transaction may well be subject to criticism even though common questions of
fact and law are not involved. When the subsequent proceedings involve sub-
stantially identical evidence, requiring no additional proof to that shown in
the first trial, the immunity offered by Section 1938 provides little protection
when applied as it was here.
The decision in the instant case also tends to obscure the fact that al-
though an additional element had to be proved in the first prosecution, i.e.,
the homicide while the felony was in progress, the offense, at least to some of
the co-defendants involved, is the same in both prosecutions, in fact and in law.
Their single act of participating in the felony did not offend against two stat-
utes. Although they were, through legislative definition, held accountable
to conviction under both, in each trial their single offense is identical.
As a question of fairness, the defendant is forced to run the gantlet on
a charge which gives the jury only a single alternative to conviction of murder
in the first degree, an outright acquittal. And this is merely because the prose-
cution considers this form of indictment as offering less of an advantage to the
defendant. Yet, having successfully defended the charge, the accused must
again submit to another charge that should properly have been considered and
disposed of at the first trial.
With the number of statutory offenses greatly increased, and because of
the expense and delay involved in awaiting trial on burdened court calendars,
it appears that a formidable weapon has been forged to prevent release of an
individual currently running the gantlet of successive and related charges.
Regardless of the results desired in any specific problem before the courts, the
concept of double jeopardy should be deserving of a more acute analysis instead
of a somewhat mechanical approach.
RICHARD KANIA
LIMITATION ON EXPANDING SCOPE OF LEGALITY OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
IN MICHIGAN
For years prior to 1914, but even more so since that time, the states in
our country have vigorously belabored the issue of admissibility of evidence
obtained during an illegal search and seizure. The United States Supreme
Court stated its position on the subject in 1914 in the famous Weeks decision.1
The rule promulgated in that case, for the Federal courts to follow in instances
where a Federal officer did the searching, was that any evidence obtained in
the course of an illegal search and seizure was inadmissible. Such exclusion,
the court felt, was dictated by the Fourth Amendment to our Federal Consti-
tution in order to safeguard the individual's right to privacy.
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 US. 383 (1914).
